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Abstract 
2 
A sense of morality, or values predisposing what is right (fair, just, kind) and what is 
wrong (unfair, cruel, dishonest), appears universally across all humankind. All major cultures 
share support for some values, such as self-respect, respect for others, and 'the golden rule'­
treat others how you wish to be treated-and disdain for some sins, such as murder, theft and 
dishonesty (Kinnier, Kernes & Dautheribes, 2000). Some moral behaviors, such as inequity 
aversion, the tendency to do no hann and cooperation are found to exist in virtually all human 
adults. But where does morality come from? Is it uniquely human or do we share some moral 
values with nonhuman animals? To explore these questions domestic dogs-nonhumans with 
exceptional social cognitive skills-were tested for moral values through a replication of a study 
on moral reasoning in human infants (Hamlin & Wynn, 2011). Dogs watched a puppet show 
with a moral and immoral actor-the moral actor helped a neutral character achieve a goal and 
the immoral actor prevented the actor from achieving the goal. Dogs generally looked longer 
when the neutral puppet chose to associate with the moral helper than the immoral hinderer, 
demonstrating that dogs, like human infants, may prefer when agents associate with moral 
helpers. Though this is a preliminary study it suggests that a sense of morality may not be 
uniquely human and may be an evolved trait shared by humans and nonhumans alike. 
Origins of Morality 
Morality is defined as a set of values differentiating right (fair, just, kind) from wrong 
(unfair, cruel, dishonest) in the subject's mind. With such a SUbjective definition, studies and 
writings on morality differ vastly. Regardless, scientists and philosophers generally agree that 
some sense of morality, of right and wrong, appears universally across all humankind. All major 
cultures uphold some common values, such as self-respect, respect for others, and 'the golden 
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IUle'-treat others how you wish to be h·eated-and disdain for some sins, such as murder, theft 
and dishonesty (Kinnier, Kernes & Dautheribes, 2000). Some moral behaviors, such as inequity 
aversion, the tendency to do no hann, and cooperation are found to exist in virtually all human 
adults. 
3 
Inequity aversion is defined as a preference for fairness and a disfavor towards inequality. 
A classic example of inequity aversion in human adults can be seen in the ultimatum game in 
which player 1 has a sum of money or rewards that they divide between themselves and player 2. 
Player 2 can either accept the proposal, and both players will get the proposed sum, or reject the 
proposal, and neither player will get anything. Players are much more likely to divide the 
rewards in an equal or close to equal way (50/50, 60/40) than they are to divide it in a way that 
they or the other player would benefit significantly more than the other (i.e., 80/20; Giith, 
Schmittberger & Schwarze, 1982). Perhaps most impressively, players engaged in a dictator 
game - shucturally equivalent to the ultimatum game but without the option for player 2 to 
decline the offer - also share rewards fairly equitably, even though player 2 cannot retaliate and 
reject the offers (Forsythe et aI, 1994). Further, participants often opt to punish 'free-riders', 
people who reap benefits but do no work, in voluntary cooperation games (Fehr & Schmidt, 
1999). The choice of punishing those who gained benefits with no effort demonsh·ates that 
human adults generally feel as though things should be fair and equal-those that work the 
hardest get the most benefits, and those that do not work get no benefit. Inequity aversion can be 
seen cross-culturally as well-Ugandan children preferred to distribute stickers equally to 
children who completed a task successfully, and were even more likely to throw away stickers 
rather than distribute them unequally (Paulus, 2015). The fact that no reward was more 
4 
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preferable than an unequal reward shows strong evidence for inequity aversion, even in non-
Westernized societies. 
Another universal trait among humans is the tendency to do no harm. Most human 
adults-save for some criminals-prefer not to harm others. They demonstrate the tendency to 
do no harm through a classic experiment-the trolley problem (Foot, 1967). Subjects were told 
to make a decision on a hypothetical situation : If a trolley with 5 passengers was about to crash 
and the only way to stop it was to saClifice one other person, what would you do? The vast 
majority of participants choose to save five people over one, showing that, generally, people 
want to cause the least amount of hmm when possible. To further support this, people in the 
study were more likely to pull a lever to save 5 and harm 1 than to actually push a person onto 
the tracks to stop the h·ain. This is because the tendency to do no harm is so great that that close 
connection between one's action and another's hann makes it that much more aversive. 
Therefore, pulling the lever to cause hmm rather than directly pushing a person was much more 
favorable. Once again, this moral trait was seen cross-culturally. When the trolley problem was 
presented to people fi'om the Malagasy tribe of Madagascar, they had different questions than 
Amelican pmticipants (who are the people involved, what is my relation to them) but regardless, 
answered in a very similar way to the American pmticipants-choosing to sacrifice one person to 
save multiple people was the more favorable response, as it did the least amount of hann (Bloch, 
2012). 
Finally, cooperation is a common moral trait mnong humans. Human adults demonstrate 
cooperation through numerous examples in day-to-day life such as not cheating during card 
games, paying back someone who is owed money, or sitting quietly in a movie theater so as not 
to disturb other moviegoers. A classic example of human cooperation is seen through the 
5 
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prisoner's dilemma. The prisoner's dilemma is an interaction where two players can earn 
different payoffs based on cooperating or defecting (Fig. I). Individuals receive the greatest 
reward by defecting, yet overall both benefit most by cooperating (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). 
Broken down, the reward for unilateral defection is greater than the reward for mutual 
cooperation, which is greater than the reward for mutual defection, which is in turn greater than 
the reward for unilateral cooperation (see Fig. 1). Pmiicipants are generally willing to cooperate, 
and more likely to cooperate when the game is being played in person than over a computer 
(Furlong & Opfer, 2009), demonstrating that personal interaction enhances likelihood to 
cooperate. A cross-cultural study on the prisoner's dilemma found that Chinese paliicipants were 
likely to cooperate, but more likely to cooperate when they were primed with awareness of their 
Chinese culture--exposure to Chinese cultural images such as a Chinese dragon and a person 
performing kung fu (Wong & Hong, 2005). Generally the participants were likely to cooperate, 
but the fact that culture priming increased cooperation suggests that cooperation is a deeply 
impOliant pmi of one's home culture. 
Subject's Choice 
Cooperate (C) Defect (D) 
§: 
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Q) Q) (J Co 0 '0 0 
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Figure I: Matrix values in a typical prisoner's dilemma game. The most beneficial rewards for both parties come fi'OI1l mutual 
cooperation (R), although the most beneficial alvord for olle party comes from defecting as the other party cooperates (T) 
(Furlong & Opfer, 2009). 
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These examples of universal behavior in human adults provide evidence that morality and 
moral behavior are traits that are common to viliually all human adults, much like traits such as 
capability of language or a preference for sweet and fatty foods, But where does morality come 
from? One common misconception is that morals come from religion; however, morality is not 
specific to religion, as secular organizations such as the United Nations and the American 
Humanist Association agree upon similar moral codes to each other and to religious 
organizations (Kinnier, Kernes & Dauthelibes, 2000), If morals don't come from religion, do 
they come from others via other fonns of social transmission? Or are they innate, built into our 
brains through evolution? 
This question about the origins of morality -whether it arises from nature or nurture - has 
been debated as far back as the 15th century, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762) takes a strong stance 
for the nativist camp, arguing that: "everything is good as it comes fi'om the hands of the Author 
of Nature; but everything degenerates in the hands of man" (pp, 1). The Rousseauvian view 
therefore, suggests that humans enter the world naturally good and then become con-upted by 
modem society. A strong stance for the empilicist camp, however, comes from Thomas Hobbes 
(1651) who argued that humans start life naturally 'brutish' but become saved from their natural 
state by society. The Hobbesian view, therefore, posited, that evil is innate, while morality comes 
fi'om environment and culture. Though arguments on the origin of morality began centuries ago, 
cun-ent research has not progressed much further. In fact, evidence supports both sides of the 
argument-some work suggests that that morality is innate while other work suggests that 
morality is learned, 
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Current Research on Morality 
7 
Learned morality theory. One argument for effects of nurture comes from admittedly 
rare, vast cultural differences in moral nonns. Cannibalism, for example, is hOiTendous and 
criminal to most, if not all, indush'ialized cultures but perfectly nonnal to headhunting cultures 
(Prinz, 20 11). Less striking but nonetheless revealing evidence comes from cultural differences 
in victimless crimes -- Brazilian citizens take a more moralizing stance than Americans to an 
offensive yet victimless action such as defacing a national flag (Haidt, Koller & Dias, 1993). In 
addition, morality takes an individualistic stance with Americans whereas it takes a collectivistic 
stance among Hindu Indians (Miller, 1994). That is to say, Americans care more about personal 
morals and personal moral decisions whereas Hindu Indians care more about group morals and 
moral decisions that affected a group rather than an individual. In the study, Hindu Indian and 
American adults were presented with scenarios where, for a selfish reason, an agent failed to 
help another with a life-threatening issue, a moderately serious issue, or a minor issue. Hindu 
Indians were much more likely to say that not helping the other person was unacceptable, even if 
the issue was minor, whereas Americans were likely to view not helping as acceptable in all 
situations except the life-threatening one. With such differences existing between cultures, 
learned morality proponents believe that morals depend on an individual's upbringing, and 
therefore are not universal. 
In addition to cultural differences, advocates of the nUlture approach point to the lack of 
a biological basis for morality as support that morality is learned (Baron-Cohen, 2013). For a 
particular trait to be considered an evolutionarily endowed (innate) trait including variability 
between individuals, heritability from parent to offspring, differential reproduction, and selection 
(sexual, natural, or artificial). In the case of morality it's not clear that these criteria have been 
8 
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met. While there is some variability in moral intuitions and moral reasoning, if a trait is truly 
innate it should be heritable. However, researchers have yet to identify a genetic basis for moral 
reasoning (Hunter, 2010). For example, morally-objectionable behaviors cannot be linked to 
genetics in the absence of confounding environmental factors (Pollack, 2006). Since no 'morality 
genes' have been discovered some are convinced that morality cannot be innate. Morality also 
has selection pressure, as people with morals are more likely to reproduce and be mentally 
sound, and cause differences in reproduction, as it is more common for someone to have morals 
rather than not (Sperber & Baumard, 2012). However, the big problem is heritability. Since there 
is seemingly no genetic basis for morality, it cannot be inherited and, by criteria, cannot be a trait 
of natural selection, and therefore not innate (Ridley, n.d.). 
Innate morality theory. Despite evidence that morals vary some across cultures and the 
lack of heritability of moral values, the evidence that morality is innate outweighs the evidence 
for the learned morality theory. Cultural differences may occur in morality, but people of all 
cultures still have some kind of morals. Cultures may differ in what exactly they think is right 
and what is wrong, but they still all have a sense that some behaviors are right while others are 
wrong. It does not matter if the specific content of these moral behaviors differ; the impOliance 
of moral values cross-culturally provides evidence that the capacity for morality itself is innate. 
Further, recent evidence hints that we may soon find some genetic basis of morality: subjects 
with a shorter serotonin transporter genotype allele were more likely to rate actions that caused 
intentional hann to another as acceptable while those with a longer allele were more likely to rate 
these actions as unacceptable (Marsh et aI, 2011). Therefore, this suggests that the genetic 
argument for learned morality may no longer be plausible as further genetic research progresses. 
9 
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The innate morality theory states that morality is not a product of our environment, but 
innately hardwired in our brains. Proponents of this theory generally provide suppOli for this 
theory by exploring moral reasoning in subjects with little ability to learn morality from 
humans-preverbal infants and non-human animals. The logic of studying these two populations 
rests on the assumption that if moral behavior is found in subjects with little to no human 
influence on their behavior, then it is highly unlikely that their morals were learned from 
experience, from culture, or from some other fonn of social learning. Human infants have had 
limited experiences, thus any sense of morality seen in infants is unlikely to have arisen from 
learning. Similarly, animals, even those that live with humans, are not acculturated the same way 
humans are, and thus if they demonstrate a sense of morality it will provide converging evidence 
that morality is innate. 
Illllate morality ill preverbal ill/allts. Preverbal infants have not yet had much 
0ppOliunity to be shaped by society, which makes them a viable candidate for the innate morality 
theory. The field of infant morality is fairly new, yet several studies have already found moral 
behaviors in infants with relatively little experience. For example, 5 and 9-month-old infants 
who observed a puppet show with a moral (a puppet who helps another puppet achieve a goal of 
opening a box to retrieve a toy) and an immoral (a puppet who prevents another puppet from 
opening the box) opted to interact with the moral actor significantly more than the immoral actor 
(Hamlin & Wynn, 2011). Interestingly this preference did not appear to arise simply from a 
preference for a puppet that helps to meet goals generally, as this preference existed only when 
the actors were animate, apparently social, beings. When the 'actor' became an inanimate green 
pincer infants no longer preferred the actor treating the pincer 'morally' over the actor treating 
the pincer 'immorally'. This work suggests that infants did not choose based on reinforcement 
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history, or which puppet offered rewards (by opening the box for the actor), but that rather their 
choice was based on the social interactions they witnessed. 
Additional evidence that infants have access to some moral intuitions comes from even 
younger infants. When 3-5 month old infants watched a puppet show where animate shapes 
either help another shape reach its goal (climbing a hill) or hindering the shape from doing so, 
they prefelTed the helper shapes significantly more than the hinderers (Hamlin, Wynn & Bloom, 
2007). In general it appears that infants judge others based on the morality of their actions by 
prefening those who help helpers and those who hann hinderers (Hamlin, 2013). 
Choosing a puppet or shape that does 'right' over one that does 'wrong' strongly suggests 
the infants used moral evaluation. These studies provide compelling evidence that preverbal 
infants make morally based decisions before language, before they have experienced these 
conditions themselves, before they could have been reinforced or punished for acting morally or 
immorally. In short, before cultural norms are likely to have shaped their moral intuitions. 
In addition to demonstrating some sense of 'right ' and 'wrong ', infants share the 
aforementioned moral traits of inequity aversion, the tendency to do no harm, and cooperation 
with human adults. Since humans that are shaped by society (adults) and humans that are not 
(infants) both share these traits, it is likely that moral behavior is innate. 
Inequity aversion can be observed in infants as young as IS-months old (Schmidt & 
Sommerville, 2011). Infants were shown a movie where a character distributed four crackers 
amongst two people. The exact distribution of crackers was blocked by a censor bar until it was 
removed to reveal one of two scenarios: the crackers were evenly distributed (two for each 
person), or the crackers were unequally distributed (one person had one cracker whereas the 
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other had three). Infants looked longer at unfair distribution as opposed to fair, a common 
measure that infants ' expectations about the distribution of crackers had been violated. In other 
words, infants expected an equal distribution and appeared 'surprised' by the unequal 
distribution. The infants had naturally assumed the distribution would be fair, so the unfair 
distribution was unexpected (Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011). 
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Although the tendency to do no hann may not be fully developed at such a young age, 
toddlers are still able to exhibit the tendency and the tendency to provide reparative behaviors 
when accidentally causing harn1. Toddlers were very responsive to their mother's distress and 
even slightly responsive to a stranger's distress (Zalm-Waxler et ai, 1992). Mothers simulated 
emotions or issues such as sadness, unresponsiveness and respiratory distress in front of their 
toddlers. The toddlers' responses were recorded by the mother initially. After one month, 
mothers returned to the lab and an experimenter recorded the toddler's response. One month 
after this, the child and mother went back into the lab and a female experimenter displayed the 
distressful actions. The study found that generally, the toddlers responded with physical or verbal 
prosocial behavior or empathic concern. The study also found that most toddlers exhibited 
reparative behavior when they themselves caused the stress as opposed to being a bystander 
witnessing the situation, and their reparative behaviors in general increased with age. 
Finally, just like adults, infants generally cooperate with others. 14-month-old infants 
were presented with an apparatus that required one to push the bottom of a cylinder up and 
another to reach an opening on the apparatus to retrieve a reward. It was impossible for the 
infants to achieve this on their own, and both steps were necessary to gain the reward. After a 
single demonstration, most children were able to figure out how the apparatus worked and 
collaborated with an experimenter to achieve the goal (Warneken & Tomasello, 2007). Since the 
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infants completing this task were only 14 months old, it provides evidence that the tendency to 
cooperate with others is a task that isn't learned from experience, but one that is likely im1ate. 
12 
Innate morality in nOll-human animals. Infants are capable of moral behaviors despite 
comparatively little adult human interaction, thus, it should come as no surprise that non-human 
animals are capable of moral behaviors as well. Since most non-human animals have little to no 
social contact with humans the existence of moral behavior in this population supports innate 
morality theory. For example, when rats were faced with two locked chambers, one containing 
food and the other containing a trapped fellow rat, the rats often freed the fellow rat before 
unlocking the food chamber (Balial, Decety & Mason, 2011). The rats were not encouraged to, 
or rewarded for freeing the fellow rat-in fact, fi-eeing the rat meant there was immediate 
competition for the food -yet rats freed their peer anyway. This study strongly casts doubt on the 
suggestion that morality arises fi'om learning, as rats did this in the absence of training and at a 
cost to themselves. Their choice to fi'ee the other rat first suggests they preferred to help another 
rather than help themselves-a moral behavior. 
Additional evidence that animals have a sense of right and wrong comes fi'om rhesus 
monkeys who refuse food when it caused another monkey to receive a shock, African elephants 
who chase off attackers of a wounded elephant, and Capuchin monkeys who give large rewards 
to fellow Capuchins even if it means that they get a small reward (Lakshminarayanan & Santos, 
2008; Poole, 1998; Wechlin et aI., 1964). These examples of pro social behavior without 
reinforcement in non-human animals add compelling evidence to the study of morality. If these 
animals engage in behaviors solely to help others, it is highly likely that they have developed a 
system of rights and wrongs. More compelling evidence comes from the fact that non-human 
animals share the same moral traits as human infants and human adults-inequity aversion, the 
13 
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tendency to do no hann, and cooperation. The existence of these traits in all three groups 
strongly suggest morality is not something that is fully shaped by the environment. 
Perhaps the best evidence for inequity aversion comes from brown capuchin monkeys 
who responded negatively when given a lesser treat than another monkey for doing the same task 
(Brosnan & DeWaal, 2003). Monkeys were trained to hand an experimenter a token for a reward. 
When one monkey handed the experimenter a token it received a cucumber, a decent reward for 
monkeys. When an adjacent monkey handed the experimenter an identical token, it received a 
grape, which is a very favorable reward for monkeys. After witnessing this, the initial monkey 
handed the experimenter another identical token, presumably expecting to receive a grape. 
Instead, the monkey again received a cucumber. Monkeys who receive an inequitable 
distribution reacted aggressively when they were given a less-than-favorable reward than another 
for perforn1ing the same action. In a similar vein, domestic dogs stopped perforn1ing a command 
for a reward when another dog was given a better reward for the same command (Range et ai, 
2009). These displays after an unequal dishibution of goods demonstrate that the monkeys and 
domestic dogs were aware of the inequity and possessed inequity aversion, much like human 
adults or infants faced with inequalities. 
Just as animals show human-like tendencies for inequity aversion the tendency to do no 
hann can also be seen. Rats were trained to press a lever for food and once they learned this 
researchers introduced a new manipulation-after they pressed the lever, a rat in an adjoining 
cage was shocked (Church 1959). The lever-pressing rat witnessed the shock but still received 
food. After witnessing another rat hanned from their lever pressing a number of times rat 
refrained from pressing the lever, even if it meant they would not receive food. The decision to 
stop receiving a reward when it came at the cost of a fellow rat demonstrates that, generally, rats 
14 
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seek to not do hann to others. Importantly this exists even at the expense of reinforcement 
history - the rats were reinforced for pressing the lever with food, not for helping the other rat. 
Thus, this provides additional evidence against leaming theory and suggests that even rats have 
moral intuitions against hanning others. 
Finally, animals demonstrate cooperation in a variety of situations. The classic task of 
cooperation involves working together to achieve an out of reach food source. Elephants were 
presented with an apparatus where they had to pull a rope to receive food (Plotnik et aI, 2010). 
However, the ropes were looped around the food such that if one elephant pulled the rope would 
unravel from the apparatus and not bring the food to the elephant. The ropes would only retrieve 
the food when two elephants each picked up different sites of the rope and simultaneously 
pulled. When the elephants discovered this, they exhibited cooperative behavior by waiting for 
another elephant to come up to the apparatus before pulling the rope. The elephants even began 
to wait for their partner to pull the rope by waiting at the gate of their partner's enclosure before 
approaching the mechanism. In a similar experiment, chimpanzees were given an apparatus and 
tools to work the apparatus in order to receive a reward. The chimps needed to move a thin stick 
and a thick stick in order to tilt a platfonn and move grapes to a reachable location. The two 
tasks could not be performed at the same time by the same chimpanzee. The chimps exchanged 
tools and were able to use the cOITect tools the cOITect ways the majority of the time due to their 
good use of cooperation. 
The fact that human infants and nonhuman animals demonstrate the same kinds of moral 
behaviors as human adults without same cultural trappings provides strong evidence for the 
innateness theory of moral reasoning. However, this viewpoint can only be suppOlied if 
continued evidence of multiple species demonstrating moral behavior arises. Therefore, species 
15 
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that may have the capability for moral behavior should be studied to see ifthey too can support 
the theory of animal morality. One species that has not been extensively tested for moral 
behavior is the domestic dog (Canis lupusfamiliaris). Dogs co-evolved with humans over 
thousands of years, and since they are so closely related with human interaction, it is possible 
that they have adapted human intuitions into their behavior. A non-human species with close 
connections to humans is worth researching for evidence of moral intuition, as they offer up the 
animal and human sides of interaction and social behavior. 
Moral Behavior in Domestic Dogs 
Dogs are incredibly social creatures and show strong inter-species social cognition with 
humans. They exhibit many human-like behaviors and cognitions such as infelTing intentions 
and solving means-end tasks (Hare & Tomasello, 2005, Range, Hentrup & Viranyi, 2011; 
Stauch, AuBuchon & Furlong, in prep). Additionally, dogs perfonn exceptionally at cooperation 
and communication tasks with humans and are able to perceive a human's actions as goal­
oriented (Wobber & Hare, 2009, Marshall-Pescini, Ceretta & Prato-Previde, 2014). Dogs can 
even communicate well enough with humans to recognize human emotions of disgust and joy 
(Turcsan et aI., 2014). Thus, dogs are very socially adept creatures. Domestic dogs even perfonn 
better than chimpanzees, our closest extant relatives, in a task involving use of social cues such 
as reaching, pointing and gazing. Further, domestic dogs also perfonned better than human­
reared wolves at this task, even if the dogs were only a few weeks old (Hare et aI., 2002). 
Since morality is a social trait that is universal in humans, and dogs share many human 
social traits, it is extremely likely that dogs have evolved moral cognition due to centuries of 
human interaction. This is not to say that moral behavior was taught to the dogs by human 
observation, but that domestic dogs evolved moral behaviors over time, perhaps due to humans 
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artificially selecting dogs exhibiting such traits. Much like any species uses adaptation to 
survive, dogs with a sense of morals may have been more likely to survive and reproduce than 
those that did not have a sense of morality. 
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We hypothesize that domestic dogs have a sense of morality, which can be demonstrated 
through their choices of social partners. To test if dogs made morally-based decisions, dogs were 
shown a puppet show similar to Hamlin and Wynn's (2011) puppet show. In this study dogs 
were shown a moral actor (who helped a neutral actor complete a goal) and immoral actor (who 
hindered the neutral actor from completing the goal), and their preference for the actors was 
recorded. We predict that the dogs, like human infants, will prefer a moral actor more, and thus 
will prefer to watch the neutral puppet interact with the moral actor to the neutral puppet 
interacting with the immoral actor. 
Methods 
Subjects 
Volunteers were solicited in two ways : by flyers or conversation at Paradise Pets daycare 
in Bloomington, IL and by recruitment emails sent to Illinois Wesleyan University faculty and 
staff. Interested owners completed an online questionnaire about their dog including the dog's 
age, breed, health history, training history and temperament. Once this was received owners were 
emailed with additional infonnation about the studies that take place in the lab. Dogs who were 
tested at Paradise Pets daycare were sent an infonned consent form to sign and return while those 
who were tested on campus were sent scheduling infonnation and were asked to sign the consent 
fonn upon their first visit to the lab. Only dogs whose owners both completed the online 
registration and signed the consent fonn were allowed to pmiicipate in the study. Subjects were 
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27 domestic dogs of multiple breeds, both male (n = 19) and female (n = 8). They ranged in age 
from 5 months to 11 years (M= 4.98, SD = 2.71). 
Materials 
The stage for the puppet show was created out of PVC pipe and black fabric acting as a 
curtain and backdrop. The pipe stage's dimensions measured 49" x 26" x 27", with the curtains 
measuring in at 49" x 26". Behind the cUliain but in fi'ont of the backdrop was a cardboard box 
covered in chrome tape and measuring 9" x 18" x 9 Y, "which acted as a stage. Three puppets (7 
y, " x 4 Y, ") were used in the show-a tiger, giraffe and cow puppet. The tiger was dark orange 
with black tiger stripes, the giraffe was yellow with brown giraffe spots and homs, and the cow 
was white with black spots and homs. All puppets had black eyes, a nose and a stitched-on 
mouth in the shape of a smile. Also used in the show were a translucent pencil box (2 Y, " x 8 Y, 
" x 5 Y, ") and a small (3" x l") rawhide bone. The puppets were operated b y  hand until the test 
trial, where the moral and immoral puppets were placed on plastic water bottles (5 Y, " x 2 Y, x) 
that were taped to the stage to keep them standing up while the experimenter operated the neutral 
puppet. 
18 
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Figure 2: The puppet stage alld actors at the end of the mora/familiarization /rial. 
Preference Tests 
A preference test was conducted to select puppets before the study began. Three puppets 
who were generally equally liked by the dogs (based on looking time) were used as the moral 
actor, immoral actor, and actor puppet interchangeably. The dogs' preferences were decided 
based on their time looking and interacting with each individual puppet when presented with 
multiple. Three puppets that the dogs interacted with/looked with about an equal amount of time 
(tiger, giraffe and cow) were chosen. The toy in the actor puppet's box, a rawhide bone, was also 
subject to a preference test so that the toy chosen was one that the dogs found mildly 
interesting-not exciting enough to be distracting, but exciting enough to ath·act their attention. 
Procedures 
Dogs were tested at an on-site laboratory at Illinois Wesleyan University or at a testing 
room at Paradise Pets dog daycare. Dogs entered the testing area and were given time to 
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acclimate to the setting and greet the researchers before the study began. The study began with 
the dog being held by a handler (EI) blind to the conditions who looked away fi'om the stage 
during testing and/or closed hislher eyes during the study. A second experimenter (E2) showed 
the dog a small rawhide bone and then put the bone in a box sitting on top of the chrome stage. A 
third experimenter (E3) was concealed behind the curtain and conducted the puppet show. 
During the puppet show dogs witnessed a neutral puppet (NP) trying, with difficulty, to 
open a box to retrieve the bone inside. A rawhide bone was chosen as the box contents to pique 
the dog's interest, as it was not too interesting or too uninteresting to the dogs. Moral agent 
puppet (MP) then came onstage and helped NP open the box by pulling at the opposite end. After 
the box opened, MP left the stage and NP grabbed the rawhide bone inside. This scene was held 
static for a 10 second looking period during which E2 filmed the dog's looking behaviors 
Next, the dogs witnessed the same scene-NP attempting to open the box-but an 
immoral puppet (IP) came onstage and jumped on the box, shutting it. After the box was shut, 
NP lay face-down on the ground to demonstrate frustration or distress and IP left the stage. 
Another 10-second looking period then elapsed. 
All dogs received both of these events in counterbalanced order and with puppets 
randomly assigned to the three different roles. Until this point ali dogs received the same 
treatment. The final test condition occurred when all three actors came onto the stage, with NP in 
the middle between IP and MP. NP looked at both puppets, and then moved to stand next to 
either the MP or IP to demonstrate its 'choice' of social partner. This choice was decided when 
an RA, blind to the conditions and the stage, calied out either "1" or "2", dictating which 
condition the puppeteer would have for the test, 1 being the first familiarization and 2 being the 
second. NP remained with its choice of social partner for another 10 second looking period. 
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If the dog looked longer when NP chose the MP, it was infelTed that the dog prefen-ed the 
MP to IP, as dogs tend to look at things they find interesting or attractive. The following were 
counterbalanced across subjects in each condition : experimental condition (social or inanimate), 
identities of actors (giraffe, tiger or cow puppet), order of shows (moral or immoral going first or 
second), and placement of actors (left or right) during choice. 
Coding and Reliability 
Primary video coding was done by the author, and two research assistants coded the same 
videos to measure inter-rater reliability. One coder was briefly and vaguely trained by the author, 
as they had no previous experience in coding a looking time study. The other coder had some 
experience but received the same tutorial. They were taught how to decipher if a dog was 
looking at the stage or not, and trained with a video not used in the study. All three coders coded 
the videos separately. Inter-rater reliability was .81 with the new coder and .95 with the 
experienced coder. 
Differences from Original Study 
The domestic dog replication study was much like the original with a few changes. In the 
original study with infants, the infant's preference was decided by recording which puppet they 
initially reached for in a testing peliod after familiarization with the actors-the moral or the 
immoral one (Hamlin & Wynn, 2011). In this replication, the dog's choice is decided by 
recording their looking time solely, not reaching, at test period after two familiarizations-one 
with the moral actor and one with the immoral actor. In addition, if the infant was not paying 
attention to the puppet show, they were excluded from the study. If a dog was not paying 
attention to the show, a squeaky toy was squeaked or their name was called so they could direct 
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their attention back to the stage. However, if the dog continued to not pay attention, they were 
also excluded from the study. Finally, the present study did not have an inanimate condition, 
only a social one, in the interest oftime. 
Results 
A 3 X 2 repeated measures ANOV A with trial type (moral familiarization, immoral 
familiarization, test trial) as the within subjects variable and condition (moral vs immoral 
outcome) as the between subjects variable revealed no interaction between trial type and 
condition (F[2, 24]=.847b ,p=.441), and no main effect of trial type (F[2,24]=2.12b,p=.142). 
However, there was a main effect of condition such that dogs in the moral condition (M=5.54, 
SD=.64) looked longer than dogs in the immoral (M=3.58, SD=.72) condition (F[ I,25]=4.12, 
p=.053). 
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Figure 3: Results of 3 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA, measuring mean looking time at the immoral and moral condiUolls (moral 
fam. and moral test, immoral fam. and immoral test), with the latter being Significantly higher (F[J,25]=4.12, p=.053). 
To explore whether this effect was due to the crucial test condition and not the less 
important familiarizations (which should have been the same across trials as they occurred 
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before the crucial test condition) we subtracted the average amount of time dogs looked in the 
familiarization tJials from the amount of time dogs looked at the test. Typically, looking time 
decreases over time, thus we would expect this to be a negative number. However, we expect 
condition differences in the magnitude ofthis value such that dogs in the immoral condition will 
decrease their looking more than dogs in the moral condition. In other words, dogs in the moral 
condition should have a difference score closer to 0 than dogs in the immoral condition. 
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A one-way ANOV A comparing this difference score in the two conditions revealed no 
significant difference in condition (F[ I ,25]= I. 7 4, p= .199). Contrary to our predictions subjects 
in the moral condition generally looked less at the test than the familiarization (M=-1.715, 
SD=2.9), whereas in the immoral condition, subjects looked only slightly less at the test than the 
familimization (M=-.34, SD=2.37). Although this difference was not statistically significant, this 
23 
Running head: DOMESTIC DOGS' EVALUATION OF MORALS 
pattern is interesting since it is essentially opposite the overall means for the test trials in which 
overall dogs looked longer in the moral case (M=4.98) than the immoral case (M =3.43). This 
result appears to have arisen from dogs looking longer on average in the familiarization trials for 
the moral actor (M=5.539, SD=.64) compared to the immoral actor (M=3.58, SD=.72). Given 
that the dogs looked longer at the moral than the immoral actor in the familiarization tasks, 
however, the difference in the immoral condition should be greater than the difference in the 
moral condition, which is the opposite of the actual effect. 
Discussion 
To further explore the foundations of moral behavior, domestic dogs were tested for 
moral intuitions. Domestic dogs have superior social cognition to nonhuman primates and other 
species and a long history of co-evolution with humans. Thus dogs would be expected to be a 
good candidate species to find human-like moral intuitions in a nonhuman animal. We hoped to 
find that domestic dogs would look longer when a moral actor was chosen as a social partner by 
a neutral actor than if an immoral actor was chosen by a neutral actor. This result would be 
consistent with the literature of moral reasoning in human infants and would demonstrate that the 
dogs were able to make judgments about the moral and immoral actors based on limited 
infornlation gleaned from familiarization trials. FUliher, it would demonstrate that and that dogs 
preferred the moral actors being chosen by the neutral actor, as that would be a logical and 
accepted choice. 
What our results portrayed, however, was that dogs looked longer at the familiarization 
trials as opposed to test trials when the choice outcome was to an immoral actor. This result is 
surprising given that dogs are not assigned to conditions - moral or immoral - until after these 
familiarization trials have been completed. Further, assignment is blind- one researcher calls out 
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a number (l  or 2) which the puppeteer then uses to assign the condition. Importantly, the person 
who calls the condition does not know which outcome I and 2 are, and the person who is putting 
on the puppet show cannot cue the dog one way or the other as she is concealed behind a screen. 
Thus, we must conclude that due to random factors we found dogs who were, on average, more 
likely to look longer in the moral condition than the immoral condition. 
These unexpected results produce more questions for further study than answers. 
Generally, it is difficult to make a definite conclusion on whether dogs preferred the moral or 
immoral actor, as the results were contradictory. The difference in looking time at the 
familiarizations support the theory that dogs prefer the moral actor (M=5.42, SD=3.43) to the 
immoral one (M=4.64, SD=3. I)but the lack of difference in test trial looking time and the change 
in familiarization to test looking time do not support the theory. 
However, the results suppOJi that the dogs may differentiate between the moral and 
immoral actor. Therefore, the dogs are able to distinguish the two, but do so in a different way 
than the infants in the Hamlin and Wynn (2011) study. The infants reached for and looked at the 
puppet in the testing period that they preferred, but the dogs did not show a significant 
preference in the testing period, or even a significant preference in familiarization trials. 
However, since the combined looking time for moral familiarization and test was significantly 
higher than the combined looking time for the immoral familiarization and test, there is another 
way of differentiating at play for the dogs. Since the dogs' looking time in the familiarization 
and the testing period for the immoral condition were very similar, whereas looking time 
dropped for the moral condition, it may suggest that a violation of expectation paradigm may be 
at play. This means that the dogs would look longer at something that they find unexpected and 
surprising. The dogs may be looking about the same amount of time for the testing period due to 
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the neutral puppet's choice of the immoral actor being illogical to them. Regardless, it can be 
concluded that the dogs differentiate between the two, but their processes for doing so are 
unknown. 
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The results garnered from the study could be interpreted as some mild support for the 
innate morality theory or the learned morality theory due to their contradictory nature. It could 
just be that the dogs in the experiment generally were longer lookers, and the differences 
between the two groups are not based on actual analysis of the actors and their behavior. 
Therefore, we could not say that morality was innate. If the dogs are incapable of preferring the 
moral actor to the immoral actor, it is unlikely that they are capable of moral intuition. This 
provides evidence for the learned morality theory, as morality must be something that humans 
learn through experience and environment, and animals are incapable of it. 
However, due to the clear differentiations between the moral and immoral actors that the 
dogs demonstrated, it is difficult to say that the differences happened through coincidence. 
Although the results contradict themselves, one can still argue that the dogs are able to discern 
between the moral and immoral actors. The processes the dogs use to differentiate the two are 
yet to be determined, but this may be discovered with further research. The simple fact that there 
is a significant difference in the looking times provides evidence that moral intuition may be 
something that is innate in domestic dogs. 
Limitations 
A notable limitation on the study was the small sample size. Generally, in a subtle 
looking time study, the preferred sample size is between 40 and 50 participants per condition. 
Given the present study only reached 27 subjects total (12 in immoral condition, 15 in moral 
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condition), we cannot say that our results are generalizable, as the sample was far too small. An 
increase in the number of subjects would most likely make the results more accurate and increase 
external validity. In addition, a larger sample size may provide clearer results. That is to say, the 
results garnered through the present study were contradictory, and a large sample size may clear 
up discrepancies. 
Further Directions 
Due to the significant results in comparison of looking time of moral vs. immoral 
condition, this subject of study is wOlih researching further. A replication of this study with a 
larger sample size would likely produce more insight on the subject and more accurate, 
generalizable results. A replication study could also extend the methods to include the inanimate 
condition as utilized in the Ol�ginal Hamlin & Wynn (2011) study to see if any significant 
differences m�se between the social and inanimate condition. The subjects could also be tested as 
within subjects rather than between subjects. That is, dogs would pmiicipate in the moral 
condition and the immoral condition to test for a difference in looking time, whereas in the 
present study, dogs were either in the moral condition or immoral condition. With dogs 
participating in both, a better conclusion could be reached to make sure individual differences in 
the length of looking time did not inhibit the results. For example, dogs may be general long 
lookers or short lookers. Without a dog's looking time at the opposite condition, we cannot be 
sure that our results are real. A long looker may look at the immoral test for 5 seconds, and a 
ShOli looker may look at the moral test for 2 seconds. By testing for both conditions, finding out 
that the long looker looked at the moral test for 10 seconds and the short looker looked at the 
immoral test for a few milliseconds would provide better infonnation about the dogs' general 
attitudes and ensure that individual differences did not skew results. In addition to this, the study 
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could be broken down by subject to see if there are differences in looking time between the sex 
of dogs, the age of dogs (old versus young) or even the occupation of dogs, as a couple of 
subjects in the study were therapy or working dogs. 
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The aim of this study was to decipher if domestic dogs were capable of having moral 
intuition by measuring their looking time at a moral and immoral actor in a puppet show. 
Unfortunately, the results do not provide us with a clear answer to the question. However, the 
results do suggest that domestic dogs are capable of discerning between moral and immoral 
actors in some way. With further research on this issue, whether it is a replication of this study or 
different studies to test dogs for moral intuition, further evidence for animal morality may be 
produced. Although this study did not provide a clear answer one way or the other, the evidence 
of discernment creates opportunities for further research to answer these questions. 
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